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1Innovations in Defense Acquisition Auctions:




• How are auctions used in DoD acquisition?
– Effective
– Appropriate
• Suggest alternative auction structure
– Iterated Information Aggregation Auction (I2A2) Mechanism
– Quality of fit affects productivity of relationship
• Test current & alternative auction structure
3Project Deliverables
• Electronic Reverse Auctions in the Federal Government 
– MBA Project Report, Whitney E. Brown  and Lana D. Ray
• Improving the Efficiency of Defense Auctions: Multi-
Stage Auctions as a Market Research Tool 
– MBA Project Report, Steven W. Vanden Bos
• Innovations in Defense Acquisition Auctions:  Lessons 
Learned & Alternative Mechanism Designs
– Technical Report, P. Coughlan, W. Gates and J. Lamping










Auctions as Exchange Mechanisms
5Forward Reverse
Open / Sequential Bid











– Participants Submit Multi–Dimensional Bids
• Combinatorial
– Participants Submit Monetary Bids for Multi–
Dimensional Items
• Hybrid
– English/Second–Price (proxy bidding)
7DoD Auctions
• Commercial Items
– Computer Software and Hardware
– Office Supplies
– Field Warfare Supplies (Tents, 
Batteries, Flashlights, Flak vests) 
– Trailers
– Refrigerators and Dishwashers
– Plasma Televisions
• Commercial services




– Services Related to 
Commodity Purchases 
(Installation Services)
• Auctions Consistent with FAR
• Auctions credited with significant savings













• Any procurement decision involves several 
interdependent choices:
1) What should be procured
2) How it should be procured
3) From whom it should be procured
4) At what price it should be procured
• Economic analysis has generally ignored question #1
– Either assumes buyer knows perfectly well what is needed …
– Or assumes question better left to other research disciplines
• However, auction theory and mechanism design can 
greatly assist in determining what should be procured
– We propose a procurement mechanism – answer to the how
question – which endogenously answers other 3 questions
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The Information Problem
• Determining what to procure is complicated by the fact 
that the relevant information is:
– Incomplete: Neither the procuring organization nor any 
individual contractor possess all the relevant information
– Diffuse: Relevant information is spread out among the 
procuring organization and all of its potential contractors
– Private: Relevant information may be known by one or few 
contractors who have little incentive to truthfully reveal
• The economic field of mechanism design is devoted 
to developing systems which:
– Create incentives for actors to truthfully reveal information
– Efficiently aggregate diverse and often conflicting information
– Identify optimal choices based on aggregated information
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Stylized Procurement Problem
• True value of procured product/service depends on:
– Performance along various measures (M1, M2, M3, …)
• Aircraft example: Speed, maneuverability, range, reliability, etc.
– Relative importance/weighting of each measure (α1, α2, α3, …)
• Information about appropriate weights incomplete, diffuse, and private
⇒Value = α1M1 + α2M1 + α3M1 +  … - P
• Ex ante information (before bids or announcements):
– DoD and contractors have some incomplete and independent 
information about optimal weighting of each performance measure
• Precision of information reflected in number of “draws from an urn”
• DoD may have more, less, or same precision as any contractor
– Each contractor knows its own cost function
12
The Iterated Information Aggregation 
Auction (I2A2) Mechanism
1) Initial auction: Each contractor submits bid (M1, M2, M3, …, P) 
based on own estimates of weights (α1, α2, α3, …)
2) Update: DoD updates its estimates of appropriate weights 
based on contractor bids and announces new estimates
3) Elimination: Contractors with least value initial bids (according 
to updated weights) are eliminated
4) Final auction: Each remaining contractor submits a new bid 
based on updated weights







1) Publish (optional): DoD publishes its own estimates of weights
2) Auction: Each contractor submits bid (M1, M2, M3, …, P) based 
on own estimates and (perhaps) DoD estimates of weights
3) Update (optional): DoD updates its own estimates of weights 
based on contractor bids
4) Award: Winning contractor selected based on (possibly) 
updated weights
Two optional stages create four single auction variations:
─ No Publish, No Update ─ Publish, No Update
































































































































































































































































































































• Competition has bigger impact with low information
– Models Second-Price auction w/truthful revelation
– Competition likely more effective in first-price auction
• Significant benefit from info pooling w/low DoD info
• Two stage auction captures ~90–100% of optimal DoD 
value in all scenarios
– Primary benefit related to systematic info pooling 
– DoD captures ~30–80% of optimal value without info pooling




• Auction theory and mechanism design have a lot to 
offer for defense procurement
– Provide a cost-effective and efficient procurement process
– Truthfully illicit and aggregate diffuse, private information
• Procurement mechanisms can be designed that:
– Create incentives for actors to truthfully reveal information
– Efficiently aggregate diverse and often conflicting 
information
– Identify optimal choices based on aggregated information
• Updating requirements and evaluation criteria 
significantly increases DoD’s value
– Carefully designing how we procure can help determine 
what to procure, from whom and at what price
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Electronic Reverse Auctions in DoD
• Consistent with FAR and DFARS
• FAR Part 1.102 (d) 
• FAR Part 4.502 (a) 
• Buy American Act
• Procurement Integrity Act
• FAR 15.306(e)(3)
• Socioeconomic Concerns
– Small and Disadvantaged Businesses
• FAR 19 
• FAR 19.5 
• FAR 13



















FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 18,401 $1,187,932,046 $1,037,440,499 $150,491,548 12.7% 
      
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 5,932 $351,179,597 $320,444,507 $30,735,089 8.8% 
Department of the Army  3,101 $146,222,796 $132,698,678 $13,524,119 9.2% 
Department of the Air Force 316 $58,553,765 $53,909,867 $4,643,898 7.9% 
Department of the Navy 1,710 $70,127,231 $63,805,400 $6,321,831 9.0% 
Other DoD Agencies 805 $76,275,804 $70,030,563 $6,245,241 8.2% 
      
USAAVEAuctions (2000- 2007)     
CECOM   188 $153,865,877 $105,214,195 $48,651,682 31.62% 
d a Final Award Price NET Savings in Dollars NET Savings in P (After: Brown and Ray, 2007)  
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FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 18,401 5.9 13.6 44.6 836.5 $8,178.44
            
Department of Defense 5,932 
             
4.7  
           
10.2  
           
55.7  
      
1,012.9  $5,181.24
Department of the Army 3,101 4.1 8.9 59.6 1048.2 $4,361.21
Department of Air Force 316 3.7 8.7 58.8 1027.7 $14,695.88
Department of the Navy 1,710 5.7 11.9 48.3 971.5 $3,696.98
Other DoD Agencies 805 4.8 12.1 55 958.8 $7,758.06
 
FedBid Results FY2002 – FY2007
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Revenue Equivalence
Highest Bidder Wins 










No Bid Above Value
Trade-Off Between 
Risk and ReturnDutch
Highest Bidder Wins 





– Actual probability = .6
– 68% of random observations within one standard deviation from the mean
– Draws as specified
±.039±.055±.077±.109±.155±.2201 STD
.561
.639
160
.380
.820
5
.545.523.491.445-1 STD
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